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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a proof-carrying code framework for program-generators. The en-
abling technique is abstract parsing, a static string analysis technique, which is used as a component
for generating and validating certificates. Our framework provides an efficient solution for certify-
ing program-generators whose safety properties are expressed in terms of the grammar representing
the generated program. The fixed-point solution of the analysis is generated and attached with the
program-generator on the code producer side. The consumer receives the code with a fixed-point
solution and validates that the received fixed point is indeed a fixed point of the received code. This
validation can be done in a single pass.
1 Introduction
To certify the safety of a mobile program-generator, we need to ensure not only the safe execution of
the generator itself but also that of the generated programs. Safety properties of the generated programs
are specified efficiently in terms of the grammar representing the generated programs. For instance, the
safety property “generated programs should not have nested loops” can be specified and verified by the
reference grammar for the generated programs.
Recently, Doh, Kim, and Schmidt presented a powerful static string analysis technique called abstract
parsing [4]. Using LR parsing as a component, abstract parsing analyzes the program and determines
whether the strings generated in the program conform to the given grammar or not.
In this paper, we propose a Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) framework [8, 9] for program-generators.
We adapt abstract parsing to check the generated programs of the program-generators. With the gram-
mar specifying the safety property of the generated programs, the code producer abstract-parses the
program-generator and computes a fixed-point solution as a certificate. The code producer sends the
program-generator with the computed fixed-point solution. The code consumer receives the program-
generator accompanied with the fixed-point solution and validates that the received fixed point is indeed
the solution for the received program-generator. Our framework can be seen as an abstraction-carrying
code framework [1, 5] specialized to program-generators which is modeled by a two-staged language
with concatenation.
This work is, to our knowledge, the first to present a proof-carrying code framework that certifies
grammatical properties of the generated programs. Directly computing the parse stack information as a
form of the fixed-point solution, abstract parsing provides an efficient way to validate the certificates on
the code consumer side. In contrast to abstract parsing, the previous static string analysis techniques [3,
7, 2] approximate the possible values of a string expression of the program with a grammar and see
whether the approximated grammar is included in the reference grammar. This grammar inclusion check
takes too much time and makes those techniques difficult to be used as a validation component of a PCC
framework.
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2 Language
For the further development of our idea, we consider a two-staged language with concatenation in which
program-generators can be modeled. The language is an imaginary, first-order language whose only
value is code. The language is minimal, so as not to distract our focus on static analysis. For exam-
ple, loops and conditional jumps are without the condition expression, for which abstract interpretation
anyway considers all iterations and all branches.
A program is an expression e:
e ∈ Exp ::= x | let x e1 e2 | or e1 e2 | re x e1 e2 e3 | ‘ f
An expression can contain code fragments f :
f ∈ Frag ::= x | let | or | re | ( | ) | f1. f2 | ,e
Operational semantics of the language is defined in Figure 3 (left).
Expression or e1 e2 is for branches. It could be the value of e1 or the value of e2. Expression
re x e1 e2 e3 is for loops. Variable x has the value of e1 as its initial value. Loop body e2 is iterated ≥ 0
times. The result of each iteration e2 will be bound to x in e2 for next iteration or in e3 for the result of
the loop. Backquote form ‘ f is for code fragment f . We construct the fragment by using the following
tokens: variables, let, or, re, (, and ). Compound fragment f1. f2 concatenates two code fragments f1
and f2. Comma fragment ,e first evaluates e then substitutes its result code value for itself. Note that the
meaning of ‘ f and ,e is the same as in LISP’s quasi-quotation system.
3 Abstract Parsing
In our framework, we use abstract parsing [4] as a component to generate and validate the certificate.
Abstract parsing derives data-flow equations from the program and solves them in the parsing domain.
In [6], we formulated abstract parsing in the abstract interpretation framework.
The key idea of abstract parsing is an abstraction of code. Code c is abstracted into a parse-stack
transition function f = λ p.parse(p,c) where parse is a parsing function defined by an LR parser genera-
tor with the safety grammar G. This choice of abstraction is necessary to handle code concatenation x.y.
If abstracted functions for the code fragments x and y are fx = λ p.parse(p,x) and fy = λ p.parse(p,y)
respectively, an abstracted function for the code concatenation x.y is constructed by function composition
of fx and fy as fx.y = fy ◦ fx.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we take a series of abstraction steps for the value domain of the semantics.
2Code
−→
2P → 2P2P→P D! → D!
−→ −→CollectingSemantics
Concrete
Parsing
Semantics
First Step
Abstraction
Semantics
Parameterized
Abstract
Parsing
Semantics
Figure 1: Series of abstraction steps for the value domain in semantics where P is the set of parse stacks.
Starting from the collecting semantics defined in Figure 3 (middle), each abstraction of the value
domain derives new abstract semantics.
19
PCC Framework for Program-Generators Kong, Choi, and Yi
To ensure the termination of the analysis, we need to provide an abstraction for the infinite height
domain 2P. Instead of using a particular abstract domain for 2P, we parameterize this abstract domain by
providing conditions which an abstract domain D] needs to satisfy.
1. D] should be a complete partial order (CPO).
2. D] is Galois connected with the set of parse stacks 2P.
3. An abstracted parsing function Parse action] is defined as a sound approximation of the parsing
function Parse action which is defined by the LR parser generator with the safety grammar G.
Finally, we derive the abstract parsing semantics for D] as in Figure 3 (right).
Given a program-generator e and an empty environment σ0, the analysis computes F = [[e]]0D]σ0
which is of type D] → D]. To determine whether the programs generated by a program-generator e
conform to the safety grammar, we check that the following equation holds:
F(α2P→D]({pinit})) = α2P→D]({pacc})
where pinit and pacc are the initial parse stack and accepting parse stack for the safety grammar G.
4 PCC Framework for Program-Generators
Figure 2 illustrates a PCC framework for program-generators, an abstraction-carrying code framework [1,
5] specialized to program-generators by means of abstract parsing. The code producer and code con-
sumers share the safety grammar which specifies the safety properties of the generated programs.
Program-Generator Abstract Parser
Received
Program-Generator
Safety
Grammar
Code 
Producer
Code 
Consumer
Send
Receive Receive
Fixed Point
Send
Fixed Point
Checker
Figure 2: A proof-carrying code framework for program-generators.
The code producer proves the safety of the program-generator by abstract parsing with the shared
safety grammar. In a complex and iterative process, the analysis computes a fixed-point solution. This
solution is used as a certificate for the safety of the program-generator. The code producer uploads or
sends the program-generator with the computed fixed-point solution.
The code consumer downloads or receives the untrusted program-generator and its attached fixed-
point solution. The code consumer validates that the received fixed-point solution is indeed a fixed-point
solution of the received program-generator. In contrast to the computing a fixed-point solution on the
code producer side, checking can be done in a single pass.
20
PCC Framework for Program-Generators Kong, Choi, and Yi
5 Issues
The proposed framework addresses two fundamental PCC issues.
1. The certificate, a fixed-point solution for the program-generator, is generated automatically by
abstract parsing.
2. Checking procedure on the code consumer side is done efficiently by validating the received fixed-
point solution.
However, we have several issues for further investigation.
1. Size of the certificate: We are not sure that the size of the fixed-point solution which our framework
generates is small enough for the mobile platform. However, there are some ideas on reducing the
size of certificates. First, the certificate can be compressed. Abstract parsing uses an abstract parse
stack as a component of the value domain. Since a parse stack is a string of characters from a
pre-defined finite alphabet, an appropriate compression algorithm can be used to reduce the size of
fixed-point solution. Second, some parts of the certificate could be deleted as long as their recovery
takes linear time to the size of the received code.
2. Size of the trust base: Similar to other abstraction-carrying code frameworks, the certificate checker
of our framework is almost as complex as the certificate generator. It is essential to simplify the
certificate checker to reduce the size of the trust base.
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